The Rise and (Relative) Fall of Earmarks: Congress and Reform, 2006–2010 by Doyle, Richard B.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011
The Rise and (Relative) Fall of
þÿ E a r m a r k s :   C o n g r e s s   a n d   R e f o r m ,   2 0 0 6  2 0 1 0
Doyle, Richard B.
Public Budgeting & Finance / Spring 2011
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45486
r 2011 Public Financial Publications, Inc.
No Claim to original U.S. government works.
The Rise and (Relative) Fall of Earmarks:
Congress and Reform, 2006–2010
RICHARD B. DOYLE
Congressional earmark reform efforts began in 2006. This paper reviews the
literature on earmarks and documents the rise and relative fall in earmark spending
using four databases. It identifies and critiques earmark reforms, including
congressional rules and initiatives taken by the appropriations committees and
congressional party organizations. Rules and committee-initiated reforms were the
most effective, producing significant improvements in transparency and expediting
availability of information. The number of earmarks and their dollar value first
dropped noticeably in 2007 after an earmark moratorium, then stabilized as
reforms were implemented. It is premature to conclude that reforms will alter the
policy content of earmarks or their distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Earmarking, Savage argued, ‘‘is an important political and budgetary issue.’’1 It became
more important in the first decade of the twenty-first century, for a variety of reasons.
Rubin noted that by 2007 earmarks had grown ‘‘beyond the ability of legislators to
evaluate and prioritize,’’ and that some of them ‘‘have been revealed as rewards for
financial donors, contributing to the impression that government is corrupt.’’2 She
also observed that the Bush Administration ‘‘attacked congressional earmarks’’ as part
of its ‘‘assault on congressional budgetary powers.’’3 Brookings scholars saw the same
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1. James Savage, ‘‘The Administrative Costs of Congressional Earmarking: The Case of the Office of
Naval Research,’’ Public Administration Review 69 (2009): 448–457.
2. Irene Rubin, ‘‘The Great Unraveling: Federal Budgeting, 1998–2006,’’ Public Administration
Review 67 (2007): 608–617.
3. Irene Rubin, ‘‘Budgeting during the Bush Administration,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance
29 (2009): 1–14.
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problem in 2007, suggesting that earmarking got ‘‘out of hand and was used and abused
in a fashion we have not seen before in recent years.’’4
In 2010, the Washington Post noted
a wave of investigations focusing on House appropriators’ actions. The Justice Department has
looked into the earmarking activities of several lawmakers, and, relying on public documents, the
House ethics committee investigated five Democrats and two Republicans on the Appropriations
defense subcommittee, finding that the lawmakers steered more than $245 million to clients of a
lobbying firm under federal criminal investigation. The lawmakers collected more than $840,000 in
political contributions from the firm’s lobbyists and clients in a little more than two years.5
According to an editor at CQ Weekly, earmarks ‘‘have been cited as a symbol of
everything that’s wrong with Congress.’’6 In a single week in 2008, three television
network news broadcasts mentioned earmarks 91 times, nearly as often as they made
reference to Afghanistan.7
Within Congress, key members have been critical of earmarking, including Senators Sam
Nunn, William Proxmire, John Danforth, and Representatives Bill Natcher and Edward
Boland. More recently, a handful of senators and congressmen consistently attacked ear-
marks as spending bills moved through Congress. Congressman Jeff Flake referred to ear-
marks as ‘‘the currency of corruption in Congress,’’8 ‘‘no-bid contracts,’’9 and a ‘‘gateway
drug to out-of-control spending.’’10 Earmarking became something of a campaign issue in the
congressional elections in 2006 and 2008, and Senator McCain employed his opposition to
earmarks in 2009 ‘‘to rally conservatives reluctant to support his presidential campaign.’’11
Earmark reform, the subject of this article, began in 2006, impacting both the process
to be followed by members of Congress seeking earmarks and the spending that results.
Three sources of reform are examined here: House and Senate rules, the policies and
procedures of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the initiatives of
congressional member organizations. The reforms are detailed and their impact on ear-
marks assessed. Lobbying reform and the role of presidents in earmark reform are not
addressed here.
4. Thomas Mann, Sarah Binder, and Norman Ornstein, ‘‘Is the Broken Branch on the Mend?’’
Brookings Institution, September 4, 2007; available from: http://www.brookings.edu/! /media/Files/events/
2007/0904governance/20070904.pdf: accessed 17 March 2010.
5. Paul Kane, ‘‘House bans earmarks to for-profit companies,’’ Washington Post, March 11, 2010.
6. Susan Benkelman, ‘‘Money Chase,’’ CQ Weekly, October 1, 2007; available from: http://
library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-000002596422: accessed 10 October 2009.
7. Eric Alterman and George Zornick, ‘‘Think Again: Out, Out, Damned Earmark,’’ Center for
American Progress, September 18, 2008; available from: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/09/
damned_earmark.html: accessed 17 March 2010.
8. U.S. Representative Jeff Flake, ‘‘Earmarked Men,’’ New York Times, February 9, 2006.
9. U.S. Representative Jeff Flake, ‘‘Of Pork and Payback,’’ New York Times, February 24, 2009.
10. ‘‘Our View. Cuts In Military Pork Fall Short Of Rhetoric,’’ USA Today, October 5, 2009.
11. Paul Kane, ‘‘Candidates’ Earmarks Worth Millions,’’ Washington Post, February 15, 2008.
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EARMARKS: A MEANS TO WHAT END, AND FOR WHOM?
Earmarking, a specific subset of ‘‘pork barrel politics,’’ has been treated at length by
students of Congress. Mayhew argued that members of Congress persistently engage in
distributive policymaking such as earmarking, in the belief that this will enhance their
electoral fortunes.12 This logic is stated explicitly by Law and Tonen: ‘‘A key element of
every candidate’s reelection strategy is to claim credit for services or programs that
generate benefits for the voters in her district. Pork-barrel projects clearly serve this
function.’’13 There is the expectation then, that earmarking will be used to advance the
electoral fortunes of incumbents and that those best positioned to earmark (members of
the majority party, the leadership, and the appropriations committees) will be dispro-
portionately rewarded; for other, but related reasons, party leaders will reward vulner-
able members with earmarks to retain control of those seats.
Engstrom and Vanberg looked at earmarks in the 110th Congress and found that the
majority party received more earmarks than the minority, that parties use earmarks to
assist their most electorally vulnerable members and to reward members who hold
‘‘agenda-setting positions.’’14
However, research on earmarks does not always or easily comport with these as-
sumptions. Frisch, for example, notes that ‘‘empirical evidence connecting the provision
of pork with improved electoral fortunes is hard to come by.’’15 This is owed at least in
part to the fact that voters are usually unaware of members’ earmarking activities. Frisch
found that in the 1994 congressional elections, ‘‘the amount of pork barrel spending
during a Congress (in this case measured as the number of earmarks) is not positively
related to the subsequent election margin.’’16 Further, although seniority was positively
associated with the number of earmarks, vulnerable members did not receive more ear-
marks than less vulnerable members. This conclusion regarding vulnerable members of
Congress was supported by a study of earmarks in the 110th Congress conducted by
Clemens and Finocchiaro, who found that members from competitive districts did not
consistently receive more earmark funding than those from safe districts.17
12. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1974).
13. Marc Law and Joseph Tonon, ‘‘The Strange Budgetary Politics of Agricultural Research Ear-
marks,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance (2007): 6.
14. Eric Engstom and Georg Vanberg, ‘‘The Politics of Congressional Earmarking,’’ (2007): 2; avail-
able from: http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1081654
15. Scott Frisch, The Politics of Pork: A Study of Congressional Appropriations Earmarks (New York:
Routledge, 1998): 143.
16. Ibid., 149.
17. Austin Clemens and Charles Finocchiaro, ‘‘Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S.
Congress,’’ paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January
7–9, 2010.
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Fisher and Rocca provide a potential solution to the problem posed by Frisch, i.e.,
that voters are not aware of members’ earmarking activities, hence will not reward them
at the ballot box. They posit the possibility that earmarks provide a return to members of
Congress by signaling potential campaign contributors ‘‘about the direction and inten-
sity of their preferences.’’18 Earmarks, they argue, are ‘‘another important form of non-
roll call position-taking in Congress and, as such, are tools (1) for interest groups to
acquire information about members’ preference and (2) for legislators to advertise the
direction and intensity of their positions to potential donors.’’19 In this context, interest
groups ‘‘provide the crucial link between distributive policy and electoral gain.’’20
Reviewing the earmarks provided by the 110th Congress, the authors find ‘‘a strong
relationship between earmarks and campaign contributions from defense groups.’’21
Put otherwise, ‘‘members of Congress seem to be receiving a considerable wage for their
earmarks and that wage provides ample incentive to engage in this sort of distributive
and signaling behavior.’’22
Crespin and Finocchiaro examined earmarks in the Senate to test the general proposition
regarding the distribution of earmarks. They found that by using ‘‘various procedural
maneuvers,’’ the majority party garnered a larger share of earmarks between 1995 and
2005.23 Further, members of the appropriations committee did better than nonmembers,
and committee chairs, ranking members and party leaders all received more earmarked
funding than others. This evidence regarding the role of the majority party is congruent, in
part, with the findings of Balla and colleagues, who examined academic earmarks between
1993 and 2000. They concluded that by ‘‘giving the minority some pork, the majority party
inoculates itself against charges of wasteful spending, but by granting the minority a smaller
share of the federal pork pie, the majority party boosts the electoral fortunes of its own
members and its collective reputation and prospects.’’24
Jeff Lazarus looked at a single year (FY 2008) of earmarks to determine the extent to
which ‘‘demand’’ may also drive distribution. The significance of a demand variable is
that it conveys a legitimacy to earmarks, otherwise linked to what Lazarus characterizes
as distribution ‘‘on a purely political basis.’’25 He finds that political factorsFmember
ideology, seniority, committee membership, and electoral vulnerabilityFmatter, but so
18. Stacy Fisher and Michael Rocca, ‘‘Earmarks and Campaign Contributions in the 110th Congress,’’





23. Michael Crespin and Charles Finocchiaro, ‘‘Distributive and Partisan Politics in the U.S. Senate:
An Exploration of Earmarks,’’ in Why Not Parties? Party Effects in the United States Senate, eds. Nathan
Monroe, Jason Roberts, and David Rohde (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008): 229–269.
24. Steven Balla, et al. ‘‘Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork,’’
American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3 (2002): 515–525.
25. Jeffery Lazarus, ‘‘Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S.
House of Representatives’’ (April 18, 2008): 1; available from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125288
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does demand, as conceptualized and computed by Lazarus, though precisely how it is
then brought to bear within Congress is not entirely clear.
Will earmark reformFchanges affecting transparency and accountabilityFalter in-
centives, distribution and more? Crespin and colleagues used appropriations data from
Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) through FY 2009 to argue that the ear-
mark reforms initiated in 2006 have not been effective in preventing members from
adding earmarks to the Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers, a document that
accompanies conference agreements. That indictment leads them to conclude that the
rules ‘‘are essentially meaningless.’’26 ‘‘The only real outcome of the reforms,’’ they note,
‘‘is a list of names attached to the appropriations bills designating who requested
the earmarks.’’27 They discount the effectiveness of this because it simply reinforces
members’ interest in publicizing their earmarks to voters at home.
Rebecca Kysar characterizes these earmark reforms as disclosure rules intended to
provide transparency and accountability, or ‘‘self-referential rules.’’28 They ‘‘aim to keep
undesirable interest group influence at bay through the principled discussion of legis-
lation and a heightened accountability of legislators’’ and to ‘‘surface previously hidden
deals with interest groups.’’29 However, such rules are, in her view, ‘‘adopted by the foxes
to govern administration of the henhouse.’’30 They have only symbolic value, and ‘‘op-
portunities to defect from the regime are many.’’31
THE EARMARK EXPLOSION
Before examining earmark reform, we must first note the expansion in spending within
earmarks that has taken place over the past two decades. And before we can measure the
change in spending for earmarks and the impact of reform, we must wrestle a bit with the
definition of an earmark. It also requires engaging multiple earmark databases, each
offering a definition and a count. The definitional issue is minimized here, in favor
of identifying major trends.32 In 2007 the Senate began referring to earmarks as
26. Michael Crespin, Charles Finocchiaro, and Emily Wanless, ‘‘Perception and Reality in Congres-
sional Earmarks,’’ The Forum 7, no. 2 (2009): 1–18; available from http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol7/
iss2/art1
27. Ibid., 25.
28. Rebecca Kysar, ‘‘Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation,’’ Cornell




32. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), ‘‘[t]here is not a single definition of the
term earmark accepted by all practitioners and observers of the appropriations process, nor is there a
standard earmark practice across all appropriation bills.’’ Congressional Research Service, Memorandum:
Earmarks in Appropriations Acts: FY 1994, FY 1996, FY 1998, FY 2000, FY 2002, FY 2004, FY 2005,
January 26, 2006, p. 2.
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‘‘congressionally directed spending items,’’ blurring the matter a bit further. That said,
and allowing for such differences, a profile of earmark spending can be constructed,
though with caution.
Spending for earmarks rose steadily and dramatically between the early 1990s, the first
available data point, and FY 2006, after which it fell sharply. By FY 2010 it appears to
have leveled off at FY 2002 levels. Data from two governmental offices (CRS and the
Office of Management and Budget [OMB]) and two public interest organizations
(CAGW and Taxpayers for Common Sense [TCS]) provide the best information on the
nature and extent of earmark expansion and retreat. Figure 1 displays the trends in
earmark spending as calculated by these four sources.
Because earmarks continue to be linked to the growth in federal spending (and thus
deficits), this relationship should be made explicit. Frisch noted in 1998 that ‘‘there is
virtual agreement in the more empirically based budgeting literature that congressional
distributive spending is not the source of the growth of deficits.’’33 But references linking
earmarks to spending growth and deficits continues, frequently within a partisan context.
In March 2010, GOP Congressman Mark Kirk noted ‘‘the dichotomy between Dem-
ocrats that were debating a trillion dollar spending bill and Republicans that just voted







































































33. Scott Frisch, The Politics of Pork: A Study of Congressional Appropriations Earmarks (New York:
Routledge, 1998): 165.
34. Office of Congressman Mark Kirk; available from: http://kirk.house.gov/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=3658%3Aban-all-earmarks&catid=39%3Afp-videos&Itemid=1
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Congress’s spending problem in last year’s [2006] election more than earmarks.’’35 ‘‘It is
no coincidence,’’ Congressman Flake remarked, ‘‘that the growth of earmarks has par-
alleled the monstrous increase in overall federal spending.’’36
Earmarks were, indeed, at flood tide in 2006. However, their impact on total spending,
never significant, diminished after 2006. If we compare earmarks in FY 2006, just before
reforms were implemented, with their level in FY 2010, we discover that spending for
earmarks fell 43.1 percent, while discretionary and total spending grew by 25.1 and 29.5
percent, respectively.37 Total federal and discretionary spending is compared with
spending for earmarks in FY 2010 in Figure 2.
CAGW
The earmark database available from CAGW is the most comprehensive, covering each of
the 20 years between FY 1991 and FY 2010.38 CAGW data indicate that spending for
earmarks grew 432 percent over this period, while the number of earmarks grew even more
rapidly, at 1,572 percent. By comparison, appropriated, or discretionary spending (the cat-
egory within which earmarks reside in the federal budget and the source used by CAGW)
increased 128 percent during this period.39 Thus earmarks not only expanded vertically, i.e.,
in terms of numbers and cost, but also horizontally, consuming a larger share of each year’s
Sources:  OMB Historical Tables, Taxpayers for Common Sense 
(http://www.taxpayer.net/index.php).
FIGURE2
Total, Discretionary, and Earmark Spending, FY 2010 (Budget Authority in Trillions)
35. ‘‘Earmark Cover-up,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2007.
36. ‘‘Earmarked Men.’’
37. Earmark spending is calculated here using data from Citizens Against Government Waste. Dis-
cretionary and total spending data come from the OMB Historical Tables.
38. Citizens Against Government Waste; available from: http://www.cagw.org
39. OMB Historical Tables.
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appropriated spending. As appropriated spending continued to grow through the end of this
decade and earmark spending dropped and then leveled off, horizontal expansion ended.
CRS
The second most comprehensive earmark database is provided by CRS. CRS does not
compile earmark information on each year’s spending bills, which explains the intermittent
pattern in Figure 1. The 10 years of CRS data that include most of the same period covered
by CAGW reveal much the same trajectory of earmark expansion through FY 2006,
followed by a sharp drop and then a rough stabilization.40 Because CRS and CAGW
define, and therefore count, earmarks differently, and started counting at different points,
they found different rates of growth. CRS data, which begin at FY 1994, indicate that
spending for earmarks grew by 57 percent by FY 2010, as compared with CAGW’s 432
percent. Similarly, CRS data indicate that the number of earmarks grew by 174 percent by
FY 2010, compared with growth of 1,572 percent in the CAGW database.
The CRS data show the same acceleration in earmark spending between the early 1990s
and FY 2006 as revealed by the CAGW data, following which spending dropped dramat-
ically. Between FY 2006 and FY 2010, the dollar value of earmarks dropped by 50 percent,
while over this same period, discretionary spending went up by 25.1 percent.41 That said,
the CRS data also indicate three years of small but steady growth in earmark spending
between FY 2008 and FY 2010.
OMB
The OMB earmark database was apparently intended to serve, at least for the executive
branch, as an official government standard for tracking earmarks. OMB defined earmarks
in 2007 in Executive Order 13457 (addressed below) and established a public, searchable
online database on earmarks to ‘‘establish a clear benchmark for measuring progress’’
toward the Bush Administration’s goals of cutting their numbers significantly.42 The da-
tabase purports to provide ‘‘more information on earmarks in one place than has ever been
available through the Federal Government.’’43 However, complete OMB data on earmarks
40. Because of varying definitions and methodologies, CRS did not aggregate earmark data for all of
the bills reviewed. Such differences are ignored here in the interest of providing a general sense of the
evolution of earmarks. Congressional Research Service, Memorandum: Earmarks in Appropriations Acts:
FY 1994, FY 1996, FY 1998, FY 2000, FY 2002, FY 2004, FY 2005, January 26, 2006, Memorandum:
Earmarks in FY 2006 Appropriations Acts, March 6, 2006, CRS Report for Congress, Bush Adminis-
tration Policy Regarding Congressionally Originated Earmarks: An Overview, November 17, 2008, Ear-
marks Disclosed by Congress: FY 2008FFY 2010 Regular Appropriations Bills, April 16, 2010.
41. OMB Historical Tables.
42. OMB, Press Release: New Features Added to Earmarks Database; available from: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/pubpress/2007/07: accessed 10 July 2007.
43. Office of Management and Budget, Earmarks; available from: http://earmarks.omb.gov/: accessed 9
October 2009.
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in appropriations bills are available for only four fiscal yearsFthe FY 2005 baseline and
FY 2008 through 2010. These data indicate a 41.3 percent reduction in earmark spending
between FY 2005 and FY 2010, and a 31.9 percent drop in their number.
TCS
The newest contributor to earmark data is TCS, capturing information for FY 2008
through FY 2010. TCS numbers show the cost of earmarks dropping by 13 percent over
this three-year period and their number falling by 26 percent.44
In sum, the data on earmarks spending indicate a significant expansion beginning in
the early 1990s that peaked around FY 2006, following which earmark spending dropped
sharply and stabilized at about the FY 2002 level. This pattern is explained by
an earmark moratorium on FY 2007 spending bills and subsequent earmark reforms
(addressed below). The conclusion of Crespin and colleagues that the new rules have had
no meaningful impact is contradicted by this data.
REFORM ON THREE FRONTS
Earmark reform began in FY 2006 and had three sources. New House and Senate rules
came first, followed by additional constraints put in place by the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees. Congressional member organizations within Congress op-
erated somewhere between these two fronts, primarily advocating earmark moratoria.
These organizations were dominated by fiscally conservative House organizations.
It should be noted that individual senators and House members made many attempts
to impact earmarks before and during the reform period. Among the most notable of
these were senators McCain, Coburn, DeMint, Feingold, and Inhofe, and representatives
Flake, Ryan, and Hensarling.45 These efforts are not addressed because they are less
concerned with earmark reform than with they are with earmark elimination. As such,
they were met with limited success. (In 2007, a motion in the House to eliminate all
earmarks was defeated, 53 to 369, with majorities in both parties opposing it.46)
The role of presidents is also minimized here, because presidents have very limited
power to control earmarks. The exception occurred during the brief period when the line
item veto was available, which President Clinton used to veto, among other spending
44. Taxpayers for Common Sense, ‘‘Taxpayers for Common Sense Releases New Earmark Database,’’
February 14, 2008; available from: http://www.taxpayer.org: accessed 18 February 2010.
45. Earmark moratorium legislation was again introduced by Rep. Flake in the House (H. Res. 1101)
and Senator DeMint (S. 2990) in the Senate in 2010.
46. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: Obey Statement on Earmarks,
February 7, 2008.
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items, some congressional earmarks.47 President Bush singled them out for criticism in
his 2007 and 2008 State of the Union speeches, as did President Obama in 2010. Pres-
ident Bush issued EO 13457, which applied to all bills passed after January 29, 2008, and
remains in effect. This EO set out a series of detailed duties for agency heads in dealing
with earmarks, encouraging agencies to implement only those included in appropriations
bills rather than reports. There is little evidence that either administration used the
authority provided by EO 13457 to impact earmark funding. In May 2010, President
Obama proposed the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010, a bill that would allow
presidents to veto earmarks by incorporating them within legislation to be rescinded.
Congress did not act upon this proposal.
Rule Reform
Following elections, each new Congress adopts rules to govern committee operations and
the manner in which legislation is to be considered. Rules are enforced by parliamentary
points of order. To address concerns about earmarks, the House changed its official rules
late in 2006, at the end of a Congress, rather than the beginning. This was the least effective
of four rule changes addressing earmarks adopted between 2006 and 2007.
As the majority party in the House and Senate in 2006, the GOP had promised ‘‘com-
prehensive earmark reform rules change.’’48 H. Res. 1000, adopted September 14 by a vote
of 245 to 171, was the result. (Notably, of the 24 Republicans who voted against the rule
change, 22 were members of the HAC.) According to this rule, earmarks inserted in ap-
propriations bills in committee or in conference would have to be disclosed, along with the
names of the members of Congress sponsoring them.49 Disclosure at this first step in the
reform process meant inclusion within the reports that accompany appropriations bills.
But H. Res. 1000 was not retroactive, and the House had already passed all but one of
its appropriations bills for the year when it took effect. Thus the rule would affect only
this single bill and conference reports, and only in the House. No earmarks were dis-
closed as a consequence of the 2006 House rule change.50
The first earmark rule change to have an impact was implemented by the 110th
Congress, January 5, 2007. Earmark reforms were incorporated in Clause 9 of Rule XXI
and Clauses 16 and 17 of Rule XXIII of the House rules package (H. Res. 6). According
47. Roy Meyers, ‘‘The Remarkable Case of the Disappearing (?) Earmarks,’’ paper prepared for the
annual conference of the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management, October 25–27, 2007, p. 6.
48. Lirial Higa, ‘‘Earmark Rules to be Separate From Lobby Bill,’’ CQ Weekly, September 11, 2006;
available from: http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport109-000002368272: accessed 3 March 2010.
49. H. Res. 1000.
50. Steven Dennis, ‘‘House Changes Its Rules on Earmarks.’’ CQ Weekly, September 18, 2006; avail-
able from: http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport109-000002372208: accessed 9 October 2009.
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to House Democrats, the new rules would help bring an end to a ‘ ‘‘culture of corruption’
that led to the GOP losing control of Congress after 12 years.’’51
The rule prohibited the House from considering bills unless a list of earmarks and
their sponsors in such bills or the accompanying report was made available in specified
public documents, i.e., committee reports (for committee-reported bills) or the Con-
gressional Record (for other legislation). Members requesting earmarks were required to
provide to the chairman and ranking member of the HAC, in writing, the name and
address of the earmark recipient, its purpose and certification that neither the requesting
member nor their spouse had a financial interest in the earmark.52 House members were
prohibited from considering special rules waiving the public disclosure requirements.53
Implementing the new earmark rule became a severe problem, ultimately providing the
incentive for the third rule change affecting earmarks. The conflict centered on the timely
publication of earmark information on the House version of the Homeland Security ap-
propriations bill for FY 2008 in June 2007. Chairman Obey said that the HAC staff had
received in excess of 30,000 earmark requests, as a result of which, more time was needed to
review them. Consequently, he indicated his intention to ignore the new House rule on the
timing of the release of earmark information and ‘‘drop the earmarks into the bills when
they move to the House-Senate conference committees before the August break.’’54
The resolution of this impasse produced H. Res 491, the third congressional rule on
earmarks. This rule addressed transparency issues affecting ‘‘air-drops,’’ earmarks added
to conference agreements that were not in either the House or Senate version of the
appropriations bills at issue in the conference. The new House rule prohibited consid-
eration of conference reports unless the joint explanatory statements accompanying them
included a list of earmarks in the conference report or joint statement, and the names of
the earmark sponsors.55
The final rule change impacting earmarks was the Senate version of the two rules changes
that took effect in the House. The vehicle, an ethics reform bill that included a section on
earmarks, became law September 14 as the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
of 2007 (P.L. 110–81). Section 521, Congressionally Directed Spending, incorporated the
Senate earmark reforms, adding them to the Standing Rules of the Senate as Rule XLIV.
The Senate earmark rules were very similar to the House rules, but not identical. Rule
XLIV made it out of order in the Senate to vote on appropriations bills containing
earmarks until the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction or the Majority Leader
provides a list of the names of senators sponsoring the earmarks. The information had to
be ‘‘available on a publicly accessible congressional website in a searchable format at
51. Steven Dennis, ‘‘House Adopts Budget, Earmark Rules,’’ CQ Weekly, January 8, 2007; available
from: http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/weeklyreport110-000002424026: accessed 9 October 2009.
52. House Rule XXIII, clause 17.
53. House Rule XXI, clause 9, section 4b.
54. Elizabeth Williamson, ‘‘Earmarks Dispute Bogs Down Homeland Security Bill,’’Washington Post,
June 13, 2007.
55. H. Res. 491.
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least 48 hours before such vote.’’56 Senators requesting earmarks were required to pro-
vide to the committee of jurisdiction their names, the name and location of the intended
recipient, the purpose of the earmark and certification that neither they nor their im-
mediate family had a financial interest in the earmark (Rule XLIV, 6(a)). As with the
House rules, points of order were used to enforce the Senate rules.
Because the Senate rules did not take effect until late in the year, their applicability to
FY 2008 spending bills may be questioned. Compliance issues aside, it should be noted
that in April, before adoption of S.1, the SAC announced that it would adopt earmark
reforms for the FY 2008 spending bills pending passage of the Honest Leadership and
Open Government Act. The new policies called for clear identification of earmarks, their
sponsor, amount, recipient, and purpose. Earmark information would be published on
the website of the SAC and the Library of Congress. Senators would also have to certify
that they had no financial interest in the earmark.57
The earmark rule changes put in place in 2007 were in effect for the 110th Congress
(2007–2008) and were adopted again in 2009 by and for the 111th Congress (2009–2010).
Committee Reforms
The HAC and SAC have initiated several earmark reforms, the most important of which
have come from the HAC. These committee-initiated earmark reforms can be seen as
operationalizing and sometimes complicating the reforms effected by House and Senate
rules. Their objectives may be more stringent than those imposed by congressional rules,
particularly as regards transparency, but committee-initiated reforms are also more
problematic. These problems stem from the fact that the processes of promulgation and
enforcement of committee-initiated rules are opaque, and because of the differences
between reforms coming from the HAC and the relatively tepid steps taken by the SAC.
Committee-initiated reforms began in earnest as Representative Obey and the late
Senator Byrd prepared to assume their positions as chairmen, respectively, of the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees in the newly elected 110th Congress. In De-
cember 2006, the chairmen announced an important committee decision affecting ear-
marks. That decision would affect the joint funding resolution (the final continuing
resolution for most FY 2007 spending) left over from the 109th Congress, and ultimately
the number of earmarks allowed. The decision stemmed in part from the campaign
statements of the Democrats in Congress, including the incoming Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi, who, had ‘‘railed for months against wasteful ‘special interest earmarks’
inserted into bills ‘in the dark of night.’ ’’58 This rhetoric, in conjunction with vocal
56. Rule XLIV, 1(a)(2).
57. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: Senate Appropriations Committee
Announces Earmark Reform Standards, April 17, 2007.
58. David Kirkpatrick, ‘‘As Power Shifts in New Congress, Pork May Linger,’’ New York Times,
November 26, 2006.
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opposition to passage of the FY 2007 omnibus appropriations bill from some congres-
sional Republicans, led to the postelection statement on earmarks and the omnibus.
Senator Byrd and Congressman Obey indicated their decision ‘‘to dispose of the
Republican budget leftovers by passing a year-long joint resolution,’’ meaning there
would be no new congressional earmarks in a bill providing $463.5 billion in
new spending.59 The measure would constitute ‘‘a moratorium on all earmarks until a
reformed process is put in place.’’60 When the joint funding resolution was filed in
January 2007, Chairman Obey explained that most FY 2007 programs would be funded
at the FY 2006 level, adjusted for increased pay costs, but the resolution ‘‘is free
of earmarks.’’61
The measure became law February 15. Thus the only new earmarks in spending bills
for FY 2007 were those in the two full-year appropriations bills approved in 2006 by the
previous Congress. This is the primary explanation for the drop in earmarks and their
cost between FY 2006 and FY 2007 seen in Figure 1. This initiative, whatever its im-
portance in constraining earmarks in FY 2007 appropriations bills, was a one-time event,
hence of marginal policy consequence.62 The data in Figure 1 support this conclusion.
More meaningful committee-initiated reforms began in January 2009, when the HAC
and SAC jointly announced additional transparency requirements. The key changes were to
require posting of data about earmark requests, as opposed to earmarks that had been
approved, and the requirement that members post this information on their own websites
rather than committee websites. For FY 2010, members requesting earmarks in appropri-
ations bills had to post information on these items when the request was made, ‘‘explaining
the purpose of the earmark and why it is a valuable use of taxpayer funds.’’63 Further, the
committees promised to provide earmark disclosure tables to the public the same day as the
relevant appropriations subcommittees release their report or 24 hours before full-com-
mittee consideration of bills that have not been marked up a Senate subcommittee.
Some additional transparency has resulted, though not without problems. Requiring
members requesting earmarks to post their requests on their own congressional websites
produced a variety of responses. In the House, compliance produced ‘‘a hodgepodge,
with some members of each party proudly displaying their requests while many
59. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: Byrd-Obey Announce FY 2007
Plan, December 11, 2006.
60. Ibid.
61. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: Democrats File Joint Funding
Resolution for FY 2007, January 29, 2007.
62. House Democratic leaders discussed but did not agree to a party-wide moratorium affecting FY
2011 appropriations in March 2010. One factor contributing to this discussion may have been the concern
that appropriations for FY 2011 may remain incomplete, as they were for FY 2007, the year of the earmark
moratorium. If the earmarks would not take effect in the end, better perhaps to relinquish them publicly in
advance. Tory Newmyer, ‘‘Majority Eyes Earmark Ban,’’ Roll Call, March 8, 2010; available from: http://
www.rollcall.com: accessed 8 March 2010.
63. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: House and Senate Appropriations
Committees Announce Additional Reforms in Committee Earmark Policy, January 6, 2009.
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others apparently did their utmost to keep their requests out of public view.’’64 Rarely
did House member websites use the term earmark in providing the required information.
Off the record, some member offices admitted relabeling, moving or altering what
their initial online disclosures ‘‘after they were criticized or after their offices became
concerned that they soon would come under scrutiny for how they first posted their
spending requests.’’65
The SAC provided a link to the websites of individual senators titled Congressionally-
Directed Spending Requests66 However, it not always clear at those websites where to
find senatorial earmark information, and some senators indicate the amount of their
request, while others do not.
The HAC also provided member earmark request data by subcommittee bill. HAC
subcommittees provide links for their bill, titled ‘‘Earmark Certification Letters,’’ which
provide access to a list of House members requesting earmarks within that bill. Letters
reflect each member’s interpretation of the need to rationalize earmark requests, in-
cluding the need to indicate the amount requested.
Another constraint to House earmarks was adopted in March 2009.67 House earmarks
would now be reviewed by the executive branch, and those directed to for-profit entities
would be subject to competition. The executive branch review, however, only required that
agencies involved in executing earmarked funds would have 20 days ‘‘to check that the
proposed earmark is eligible for funding and meets goals established in law.’’68 The com-
petition mandate is similarly vague, requiring that earmarks ‘‘directed to for-profit entities
will undergo a competitive bidding process.’’69 This reform was not adopted by the SAC.
OMB made no commitment to the 20-day deadline imposed by the HAC, which
would have most likely been difficult to achieve. OMB agreed only to provide ‘‘answers
to factual questions articulated by Chairs of relevant House committees of jurisdiction in
as timely a manner as possible,’’ but these responses ‘‘should not be construed as an
evaluation or recommendation of specific requests based on merit or value.’’70
Because the SAC had not agreed to compete for-profit earmarks, the issue had to be
resolved when the Senate took up its FY 2010 appropriations bills. The resolution found in
the defense appropriations bill indicates the problem agencies faced in implementing the
competition for for-profit earmarks requirement. It also illustrates the fragmentation of
64. Jared Allen, ‘‘Earmarks: Online hide and go seek,’’ The Hill, April 7, 2009; available from: http://
thehill.com/: accessed 10 October 2009.
65. Jared Allen, ‘‘Earmark scofflaws get pass,’’ The Hill, April 22, 2009; available from: http://
thehill.com/: accessed 10 October 2009.
66. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Congressionally Directed Spending Requests;
available from: http://appropriations.senate.gov/cdsr.cfm: accessed 10 October 2009.
67. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release: Pelosi, Hoyer, and Obey An-
nounce Further Earmark Reforms, March 11, 2009.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. OMB, Letter to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, April 16, 2009.
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earmark reform policy originating with committees. The HAC and SAC agreed that ear-
marks to for-profit entities originating in Senate appropriations bills would not be held to
the HAC standard, but those originating in the House would. Those (roughly 5 percent)
with both House and Senate sponsors would be exempt from the House competition
requirement the first year, but would fall under that requirement in subsequent years.71
As the FY 2011 appropriations season began, the chairman of the HAC set the stage
for the continuation of earmark reform. After reviewing the reforms of 2007 and 2009, he
informed his House colleagues that these rules would be retained (and in one case,
stiffened) for FY 2011 appropriations bills, and announced a goal of holding earmarks
below 1 percent of discretionary spending. He then added two more conditions for FY
2011 appropriations. Rather than mandating competition for earmarks to for-profit
entities, such earmarks were to be prohibited. Further, agency Inspector Generals would
be tasked with inspecting earmarks to nonprofit earmark recipients to insure that for-
profit entities do not receive earmark funding. The chairman also promised to provide
additional transparency with the establishment by the HAC of an on-line ‘‘one-stop’’
link to display all earmark requests from House members. This may make it more
convenient to access this data, which had been previously provided by bill on the HAC
subcommittee websites, though it is not clear that any new information will result.72
The SAC did not consider these reforms necessary. The chairman of the SAC po-
sitioned the Senate above earmark problems, noting that he understood ‘‘the reasons
why the House might feel it is necessary to adjust its practices in light of previous
problems in that body.’’73 Senator Inouye then indicated his satisfaction with Senate
earmark policy: ‘‘The policies that the Appropriations Committee has adopted for the
Senate safeguard the Senate’s constitutional role in directing spending decisions while
ensuring transparency and strict control on the practice of earmarking.’’74
The reforms of March 2010 capture nicely the problem with committee-initiated re-
forms. They materialized, as did many previous committee-initiated reforms, as an an-
nouncement from a congressional committee. The Wall Street Journal reported this
event as follows: ‘‘The ban was not voted on by the House, but was simply agreed to by
Rep. David Obey (D., Wis.) and Rep. Norm Dicks (D., Wash.) who control the process
for adopting House spending bills.’’75 We can speculate regarding the motives for the
change, but there is no public record. Similarly, the reform was unilateral, i.e., the Senate
71. David Clarke, ‘‘Democrats Are Ready To Move Appropriations Conference Agreements,’’ CQ
Today, September 25, 2009; available from: http://corporate.cq.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=101: accessed 10
October 2009.
72. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Dear Colleague letter, January 25, 2010, and
Press Release; Appropriations Committee Bans For-Profit Earmarks, March 10, 2010.
73. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Press Release, Senate Appropriations Committee
Policy on Earmarks, March 11, 2010.
74. Ibid.
75. Corey Boles, ‘‘House Curbs Earmarks, Senate Balks,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2010. It
should be noted that Rep. Dicks, who replaced Rep. Murtha as chairman of the Defense. Appropriations
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did not follow, which means that the disposition of earmarks to for-profit entities will
occur in the context of conference negotiations between the House and Senate on FY
2011 appropriations bills. It was also unilateral in that House Republicans had not been
involved in the HAC decision. To compound the issue, House Republicans upped the
ante the day after the HAC announcement, declaring their intention to ban all earmarks,
not just those to for-profit entities (addressed below).76
Reform and Congressional Party Organizations
The decision by House Republicans noted above is an example of another front in the
earmark reform conflict. The decision was taken by the House Republican Conference,
in the form of a resolution. The House Republican Conference is the official represen-
tation of the Republican Party in the House. Other organizations within Congress also
attempted to influence earmark reform. Most active in the House, these organizations
included some ad hoc, informal, and temporary Member groups and some congressional
Member organizations (e.g., the Republican Study Committee [RSC]).77 Although these
efforts have had minimal effect on earmark policy to date, they are worth noting, as
indicators of the political salience of this issue and perhaps of the direction for future
reform. This may be particularly relevant as re earmark moratoria.
The primary earmark reform theme advanced by House Republican groups was a mor-
atorium pending adoption of additional reforms to be developed by a bipartisan committee
on earmarks. In November 2007, for example, Republican members of the HAC, sup-
ported by the RSC, proposed a moratorium on earmarks and the establishment of a
bipartisan bicameral select committee on earmark reform.78 This offer was renewed in
January 2008, with the additional support of the Republican Leader, Whip and Chief
Deputy Whip, three members of the Republican Conference, and members from the Na-
tional Republican Congressional Committee, the Republican Policy Committee and the
Rules Committee. These House Republicans notified the Speaker of their belief that ‘‘the
earmark system should be brought to an immediate halt, and a bipartisan select committee
should immediately be established for the purpose of identifying ways to bring fundamental
change to the way in which Washington spends taxpayers’ money.’’79
(footnote Continued)
Subcommittee of the HAC, does not control other appropriations bills in the House, contrary to the
implication of this statement.
76. Edward Epstein and David Clarke, ‘‘House Republicans Embrace One-Year Moratorium one
Earmarks,’’ CQ Today Online News, March 11, 2010; available from: http://www.cq.com/doc/news-
3359245?wr=bzR2QWhQbmtjMG0xMU1TOVZRaGt4QQ
77. House CMOs are registered with the House Committee on Administration; available from: http://
cha.house.gov/member_orgs111th.aspx.
78. Jonathon Allen, ‘‘House GOP Group Seeks Special Unit to Review Earmarks,’’ CQ Today,
November 15, 2007; available from: http://corporate.cq.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=101: accessed 10 October 2009.
79. Letter from House GOP members to Honorable Nancy Pelosi, January 25, 2008; available from:
http://republicanleader.house.gov/news/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=82597: accessed 9 October 2009.
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In the meantime, House Republicans indicated their intent to adopt ‘‘a series of
earmark reform standards that we insist that all House Republican members honor.’’80
These standards included the following:
1. No projects named for themselves
2. No airdrops
3. No ‘‘pass-through’’ earmarks (earmarks that disguise actual recipients)
4. More details provided with earmark requests
5. Earmark recipients must put up matching funds for projects.81
A Select Committee on Earmark Reform was eventually put in place in the House, but
it was neither bipartisan nor bicameral. Its 10 members are all Republicans. Its impact
has been primarily in the form of press releases and proposals, none of which have been
adopted by either Republicans or Democrats. It was charged with filing a report no later
than February 16, 2009 with recommendations for reform, but has not done so. Some of
its activities are captured on the website devoted to earmark reform launched by the
House Republican leadership in February 2008 to support the committee.82
In March 2009, House GOP Conference Chairman Adam Putnam attempted (without
success) to pressure his party leadership into denying committee leadership positions to
House Republicans who did not adhere to the standards proposed by the House Re-
publican leadership.83 In May, the RSC circulated a letter asking House GOP leaders to
adopt the RSC position on earmarks, i.e., a one-year moratorium; the leadership, how-
ever, declined a GOP-only moratorium, opting to propose a bipartisan moratorium
instead. Speaker Pelosi declined this offer.
On the Senate side, a Fiscal Reform Working Group chaired by Senator Lugar was
announced by the Republican leader in January 2008. The panel was ‘‘to review the
earmark process for spending and revenue and recommend additional means for the
Senate to bring greater transparency and fiscal responsibility to government spending.’’84
The five senators issued their report March 11, recommending a set of principles for the
Republican Conference. After carefully acknowledging ‘‘the Constitutional responsibil-
ity of each Member of Congress to make decisions on the appropriation of federal
taxpayer funds,’’ the report recommended that:




82. Congress, House, Select Committee on Earmark Reform, 110th Congress, 2nd sess.; available
from: http://earmarkreform.house.gov/: accessed 9 October 2009.
83. Susan Crabtree, ‘‘Choose reform or panel post, Putnam warns,’’ The Hill, March 5, 2009; available
from: http://thehill.com/: accessed 9 October 2009.
84. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, Press Release: McConnell Announces Fiscal Reform Working
Group, January 30, 2008.
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2. Senators should provide detailed information about earmark requests on their
individual websites as well as websites of relevant committees in searchable formats
at least 48 hours before floor consideration; the disclosure data should include the
name and address of the intended recipient, full justification (financial/budget
plans, federal matching requirements, and reasons for a lack of nonfederal fund-
ing), evidence that the requesting member will not benefit financially and whether
or not the earmarked funds will be competed.
3. The administration should provide greater transparency for the earmarks it in-
cludes in the budget request to Congress.
4. Savings from earmarks removed from legislation should be used to reduce the
national debt.85
The Senate Republican leader hedged his bet regarding the prospect of proposing
these reforms in the form of a rule and ‘‘would not say whether his conference would
adopt the plan if Democrats do not want to go along.’’86 Item two on this list is the only
one that proved relevant, but it was, in part, moot. The rules adopted by the Senate for
the 111th Congress before the report was issued addressed the primary earmark dis-
closure issue it raises. The Senate was not willing to adopt measures requiring the ad-
ditional information recommended by the Fiscal Reform Working Group.
The possibility of a second moratorium on earmarks was raised by the approval of a
unilateral ban on earmark requests for FY 2011 by the House GOP Conference in March
2010.87 The Republican Leader threatened to use the power of the Republican Steering
Committee over committee assignments to enforce the ban.88 The fact that the endorse-
ment came from the Republican Conference rather than a subordinate Republican-led
group suggests a broader consensus among House Republicans on this issue (though
some House Republicans went on record as disagreeing with the ban, indicating that they
would request earmarks for FY 2011). A resolution inviting House Democrats to join the
GOP moratorium, supported by 162 House Republicans, including their leadership, was
85. Congress, Senate, Report of the Fiscal Reform Working Group, March 11, 2008; available from:
http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/indianaspending/pdf/Fiscal_Reform.pdf : accessed 9 October 2009.
86. Manu Raju, ‘‘Senate GOP earmark plan hits hurdles quickly,’’ The Hill, April 3, 2009; available
from: http://thehill.com/: accessed 9 October 2009. One prominent earmark opponent in the Senate has
recently decided that ‘‘You don’t save anything by cutting earmarks,’’ and ‘‘earmark-bashing misses the
more important goal: reducing overall spending.’’ Brian Friel, ‘‘Inhofe: Earmarks Are Good For Us,’’
National Journal, March 6, 2010.
87. Edward Epstein and David Clarke, ‘‘House Republicans Embrace One-Year Moratorium on
Earmarks,’’ CQ Today Online News, March 11, 2010; available from: http://www.cq.com/doc/news-
3359245?wr=bzR2QWhQbmtjMG0xMU1TOVZRaGt4QQ: accessed 17 March 2010. House Democrats
also considered a party-wide ban on FY 2011 earmarks, calculated in part by the anticipation that ear-
marks would be scrapped for that year anyway because of the difficulties Congress would confront in
completing appropriations bills using the regular process. No decision on this matter was taken by the
Democratic leadership. Tory Newman, ‘‘Majority Eyes Earmark Ban,’’ Roll Call, March 8, 2010.
88. Jackie Kucinich, ‘‘Boehner Warns of Consequences for GOP Members Seeking Earmarks,’’ Roll
Call, May 19, 2010.
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introduced in the House, but never came up for a vote. It included another call for a
bi-partisan, bicameral committee to study and then reform the earmark process.89
In March, the Senate defeated a proposal for a similar ban by a vote of 68 to 21, with
15 Republicans voting against the ban.90 The next month, a two-year prohibition on
earmarksFto be achieved by requiring a two-thirds majority to approve bills containing
earmarksFsponsored by a Senate Democrat was defeated by a 2-to-1 majority.91
Fiscal conservatives in the Senate (two Republicans and two Democrats) launched an
oblique attempt at earmark reform by calling for ‘‘a new centralized earmark da-
tabase.’’92 The database would ostensibly provide better access to most of the same kind
of data that has been mandated by congressional rules and committee reforms. It would
address a need for consolidation and clarification of earmark information. Further, and
as noted here, compliance with the existing disclosure rules is a problem, though whether
the proposed Earmark Transparency Act would solve those problems is uncertain. Key
senators suggested that technical difficulties would prohibit passage of the bill, which
died in committee.
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Following two and a half decades of significant growth, spending for earmarks
peaked in FY 2006, then dropped noticeably after the FY 2007 earmark moratorium.
Subsequently, and most likely as a consequence of the reforms instituted for FY
2008–2010, earmark spending has stabilized at about $20 billion, approximately where it
was in 2002. Discretionary spending continued to expand after 2007, minimizing the
cramping effect of earmarks noted in the rise in earmarks before that year. Figure 3
uses average annual rates of growth in the relevant variables to compare pre and post-
reform periods.
The reforms implemented through congressional rules and committee policies during
the 110th and 111th Congresses have demonstrably increased transparency of and ac-
countability for earmarks. It is now possible to observe earmarks as they move through
the appropriations process, from request to approval, and, usually, to connect them to
individual members of Congress. This visibility is almost certainly linked to the decline in
spending for earmarks evident in the databases reviewed here.
89. Jackie Kucinich, ‘‘House GOP to Push Ban on All Earmarks This Year,’’ Roll Call, April 21, 2010:
accessed 10 July 2010.
90. Emily Pierce, ‘‘GOP Splits as Senate Defeats Earmark Moratorium,’’ Roll Call, March 16, 2010:
accessed 17 March 2010. Republican Senator Bob Corker from Tennessee, publically withdrew his FY 2011
earmark requests, suggesting that the cost of those requests was less problematic than the process, ‘‘which is
fundamentally flawed and lacks oversight.’’ Dan Friedman and Humberto Sanchez, ‘‘Corker Become
Latest Republican To Reject Earmarks,’’ ConressDaily AM, April 15, 2010.
91. Bob Edgar and Bill Goodfellow, ‘‘The real problem with earmarks,’’ The Hill, April 19, 2010.
92. Paul Singer, ‘‘Coburn Bill Targets Earmarks,’’ Roll Call, May 11, 2010.
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Committee-initiated earmark reform has been dominated by the HAC, with the SAC
following, intermittently. Committee-initiated reforms have expedited the availability of
information on earmarks and bolstered the use of the internet to provide transparency. It
remains difficult to assess committee reforms because the committee reform process,
including enforcement measures, is opaque. Where only one of the Appropriations
Committees implements an earmark reform, the impact is diminished. Party-oriented
congressional organizations had a minimal effect on earmark reform, notwithstanding
their intentions and the publicity they have received.
A small subset within Congress continues to dominate earmark allocation. Among
those key players are members of the HAC and the SAC, whose leadership is also critical
to earmark reform. The role of these committees in the distribution of earmarks is not
likely to diminish in the postreform era, because the incentive to seek them remains.
Schick observed this long before the reforms examined here, noting that ‘‘earmarks
survive periodic reform campaigns because the chief political value of serving on Ap-
propriations is to bring home the bacon, not to guard the Treasury.’’93
Notwithstanding the small and diminishing share of discretionary and total spending
attributable to earmarks, some within Congress continue to argue that earmarks are a
serious threat to fiscal solvency. In proposing a Senate ban on earmarks in 2010, Senator
DeMint argued that earmarks ‘‘are at the heart of the spending addiction in Congress.’’94
Following the House GOP earmark ban, Senator DeMint went further, stating that
‘‘earmarks were used to grease the skids for the bailouts, stimulus and health care
FIGURE 3
Average Annual Rates of Growth Before and After Earmark Reform
93. Allen Schick, The Federal Budget, Politics, Policy, Process (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 2000): 212.
94. Office of Senator Jim DeMint, Press Release, ‘‘Senators Call for Earmark Moratorium & Balanced
Budget Amendment,’’ February 4, 2010.
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takeover.’’95 But the bailout bill (The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act) and the
stimulus bill (The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) had no earmarks. That is
also the case regarding the health care bills Congress passed at the time this statement
was made, unless the definition of earmark is significantly broadened.
That said, earmarks have been considered a catalyst for passage of appropriations
bills. The chairmen of the HAC and SAC subcommittees typically provide earmarks
sufficient ‘‘to give the appropriations bill a solid base of support in the full committee
and on the floor.’’96 If these trade-offs are diminished as a consequence of earmark
reform, Congress will have more difficulty passing appropriations bills.
The DeMint comment above is of a piece with the GOP earmark critique, which
incorporates two potentially conflicting themes. Earmarks are considered inherently bad
for the budget, either directly or indirectly, and as such, must be banned. The ban, however,
is usually linked to the notion that reform, as yet imperfect, will somehow change the
process and allow earmarks some redemption. For example, in announcing the FY 2011
earmark ban, the House Republican Leader stated that it means the beginning of ‘‘a process
for bringing more transparency and accountability to how we spend the American peoples’
money . . . what the American people want to see is a process that does have all the
transparency and accountability it ought to have. But we’re not going to get to a cleaned up
process until we break with the past.’’97 Senator DeMint repeated this suggestion: ‘‘Isn’t it
time we took a time out to see if we can reform the system?’’98
Senator McCain made the same point as part of his endorsement of the Earmark
Transparency Act of 2010, noting that ‘‘’it is abundantly clear that the time has come for us
to eliminate the corrupt, wasteful practice of earmarking. While we work toward that end,
it is important that we give the American people the ability to see how their money is being
spent.’’99 By combining calls for earmark bans with calls for earmark reform, the distinction
is blurred between a ban as a necessary prelude to reform and a ban as the reform itself.
As detailed above, earmarks have indeed experienced a break with the past, beginning
with a moratorium, followed by reforms that added important elements of transparency
and accountability and stabilized earmark spending. Public interest databases have used
this information to provide another dimension of transparency (and interactivity) to the
earmark process. For example, the Center for Responsive Politics provides data linking
95. Office of Senator Jim DeMint, Press Release, ‘‘DeMint Applauds House GOP for Bold Lead-
ership on Earmark Ban, March 11, 2010.
96. Schick, p. 212.
97. House Republican Conference, Press Release, ‘‘Republican Leader Press Conference,’’ March 11,
2010.
98. Alan Ota, Senators Quash DeMint’s Attempt to Place Moratorium on Earmarks for a Year,’’ CQ
Today Online News, March 16, 2010: accessed 17 March 2010.
99. U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, ‘‘Senators Coburn, McCain, Feingold and Gillibrand Introduce Bill
to Create Earmark Database Requested by President Obama,’’ Press Release, May 11, 2010.
Doyle / The Rise and (Relative) Fall of Earmarks 21
member earmarks to campaign contributors.100 We may be approaching a marginal rate
of return on transparency and accountability for earmarks in the federal budget.
The process now used to move earmarks through Congress can be compared with the
one that provides for mandatory spending. Appropriations bills must be passed by
committees, then the full House, Senate, and conference committees each year, and all of
the information about earmarks must be provided pursuant to the reforms of 2006–2010.
Many votes and much informationFwho was asking for and receiving whatFwere
involved in providing the 0.004 percent of total spending that earmarks comprised in FY
2010. On the other hand, mandatory spending (mostly entitlements, dominated by Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid), made up 65 percent of FY 2010 spending, and
occurred without naming a name or taking a vote.101
Earmark transparency and accountability may result in moreFand more pointedF
questions to lawmakers regarding the value of earmarks for their districts and states, as
compared with the role earmarks play in direct or indirect sources of campaign contri-
butions. This may alter the quality and quantity of earmarks. For-profit entities may more
frequently find themselves competing for funds.102 The FY 2010 defense appropriations
bill passed by the House is cautionary, suggesting that the links among lobbyists, HAC
members, earmarks, and campaign contributions remain in place.103 Members of Congress
may be shifting earmarks intended for private companies (banned by House Democrats
for FY 2011) to nonprofits, which, in turn, will distribute the funding to the intended for
profit sources.104 The effect of the reforms is a function of their durability, the interests and
decisions of the congressional appropriations committees and interest groups and con-
tinued media attention.
100. Available from: http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/earmarks.php?cycle=2008
101. This ignores votes on budget resolutions, which are not laws, but which can be seen as confirming
the mandatory spending portions of the budget. Earmark spending for FY 2010 was taken from TCS; total
and mandatory spending was taken from OMB’s Historical Tables.
102. Some lobbyists may be directing their for-profit clients toward ‘‘competitive grant programs run by
the Obama administration.’’ Kevin Bogardus, ‘‘Earmark bans forcing K Street to get creative,’’ The Hill,
March 15, 2010.
103. ‘‘The Center for Public Integrity found that 10 of the 16 members of the House subcommittee on
defense appropriations obtained 30 earmarks in the bill worth $103 million for contractors currently or
recently employing former staffers who have become lobbyists.’’ Carol Leonnig, ‘‘Ex-Staffers Winning
Defense Panel Pork, Study Finds,’’ Washington Post, October 8, 2009.
104. Eric Lipton and Ron Nixon, ‘‘Companies Find Ways to Bypass Ban on Earmarks,’’ New York
Times, July 4, 2010.
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